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Abstract Arguing a case by way of analogy can be perilous. Each problem has its own
particulars that analogy and examples from other domains often obscure. Therefore it is
with some trepidation that this paper discusses similarities and differences between the
poker-machine (EGM) and the tobacco industries. The author has no special knowledge of
the tobacco industry beyond that of the reasonably informed citizen. Rather it is out of
concern about ethics and product safety for EGMs that the paper addresses the following
question: what, if any, are the substantive ethical differences between the EGM industry and
the tobacco industry?
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Answering a significant question will help to illuminate why public policy on EGMs—in
Australia certainly, but elsewhere also—is ethically blind. By ‘blind’ I mean that policy
does not take an ethical perspective. This is not to say that it does not have one, just that it
does not consider ethics explicitly. The question I will consider below is: what, if any, are
the substantive ethical differences between the EGM industry and the tobacco industry?
Differences surely exist, but the ones I will emphasize are not so obvious. It will take a little
time to explain them, so it is easier to start by pointing out rather obvious similarities.
My own ethical perspective will be evident to the reader as the argument unfolds.
However, let me say now that it is a form of moral realism that necessarily joins ethical and
other facts in the world. I have articulated my approach elsewhere (Doughney 2005; 2004;
2002) and will not say more here, save to acknowledge a debt to Julius Kovesi, whose work
remains insufficiently recognized (see e.g. Kovesi 1967). The approach that I endeavor to
articulate also contains a practical emphasis on eliminating avoidable harms or suffering
(wrongs, evils, injustices). Thus those who might have perspectives on ethics as otherwise
different as those of Raimond Gaita and Peter Singer (see e.g. Gaita 1999; Singer 1993)
might still agree with my conclusions.
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The most obvious similarity between the EGM industry and the tobacco industry is that
both market harmful or unsafe products. Hence both industries face regulations that other
businesses do not. For example, it is illegal to sell tobacco products to minors. It is illegal
for minors to enter gaming rooms of venues. Implicit in such regulations is the notion of
consenting adults: adults, we assume, are capable to exercise informed consent. The state,
however, intervenes to protect minors from the harms that smoking and EGMs cause.
Another important similarity is that the tobacco and EGM industries offer powerfully
control-impairing products. Regular use works to extinguish control by users, and it is this
that sets in motion the chain of events and decisions that cause harm. Loss of control over
time spent at the machines and, therefore, over income lost also extinguishes any reasonable
notion of informed consent.
Regardless of whatever ‘pleasures’ smoking and EGMs may provide, it is true that both
products also cause death. Tobacco products cause sequences of biological changes that
cause, among other illnesses, fatal cancers and cardiovascular disease. This occurs especially
among heavier smokers and those with existing susceptibilities, co-morbidities or exposures
(e.g. asthma, family history, asbestos). Similarly EGM use, especially heavy use, can com-
bine with other factors (e.g. co-morbidities such as depression) to cause a sequence events
and decisions that culminate in suicide.
In the State of Victoria in Australia between June 2001 and June 2005, the National
Coroners’ Information System estimated that a minimum of 70 suicides had gambling
problems as their principal cause. The report, which used Victorian Coroners’ findings as
evidence, warned that the ‘figures provided may be an under-representation of relevant
deaths’ because another, interrelated, cause was cited by the Coroner. According to a manager
of a regional Gamblers’ Help service, Julie Nelson:
It’s very easy to minimize the effect—I know of suicides which were gambling-related,
but in the coronial inquest they said it was because of family failure or business failure...
We have a lot of people who say they have thought about it, certainly contemplated
suicide... but most of those people have been able to find enough reasons to go on.
(Cited in Butler 2005)
The National Coroners’ Information Service report said that 68 of the 70 recorded
gambling-related suicides were by EGM users or their partners. The report was the first of its
kind.
Six years earlier the Australian Medical Association (AMA) had issued a position state-
ment on gambling problems. Remarkably, the AMA advised its members to integrate into
their practice measures to identify and treat problem gambling. The 1999 statement said, inter
alia, that:
1. Medical practitioners should be aware of the adverse impacts of problem gambling on
the physical and mental health of individuals and their families. Patients with problem
gambling may present with symptoms which appear unrelated to gambling. Other
patients may present with health-related concerns arising from a family member’s
gambling problem.
2. Medical practitioners should include gambling as part of their systematic lifestyle risk
assessment when taking a medical history.
3. Where a gambling problem is suspected, a psycho-social assessment should be
undertaken.
4. Where relevant, a shared-care approach to the case management of people with gambling
problems and their families may be developed. The general practitioner can be assisted
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by community agencies such as gambling intervention and counseling services, com-
munity mental health, relationship counseling, alcohol and drug, financial advisory
services and legal services.
5. Information kits which include screening and assessment questionnaires should be
available to all medical practitioners, especially general practitioners, to help identify,
manage and refer patients affected by problem gambling.
6. Undergraduate and postgraduate medical education courses should include the recog-
nition of problem gambling as a health issue. Medical practitioners are encouraged to
participate in continuing education related to the detection and management of the
adverse health effects of problem gambling.
A later study by the AMA, in 2002, said that in one in 50 patients attended a medical
practice explicitly because of problems with gambling. EGMs were the overwhelming
cause. Of course, the AMA’s reaction is hardly surprising or odd. Medical practitioners
surely will develop codes to address the public health aspects of all manner of new social
phenomena. What should strike us as surprising and odd about doctors including ‘gambling
as part of their systematic lifestyle risk assessment when taking a medical history’ (AMA
1999) is that they do so because governments1 in Australia, New Zealand and elsewhere
actually created the EGM problem.
That is one important difference from the tobacco industry. Governments created the EGM
industry in response to the rise of the neo-liberal policy agenda that required their budgets—
especially their social budgets—to be cut in order to ‘fund’ tax cuts for businesses and
individuals. Governments licensed the industry and either created or transformed the
enterprises that would supply the EGM ‘product.’ In doing so, and in continuing to rely on
EGM revenues, governments intentionally, and by their own volition, became causal agents
in the resulting harm. That harm can be grave. According to the AMA position statement:
The AMA acknowledges that the social, physical and mental health of people with
problem gambling and of their families are often at risk as a result of reduced house-
hold income and associated social disruption. They may experience stress-related
physical and psychological ill health. Other adverse effects include family breakdown,
domestic violence, criminal activity, disruption to or loss of employment and social
isolation. Additionally, problem gambling may compromise their capacity to afford
necessities such as adequate nutrition, heating, shelter, transport, medications and
health services.
Severe problem gamblers are at risk of self-harming behavior including attempted suicide.
(AMA 1999)
Clearly none of the harms of EGMs or tobacco are inconsequential. It is an odd word,
‘inconsequential.’ Its positive form, ‘consequential,’ means, literally, that these harms have
consequences. In this context it means that ‘they matter.’ Indeed, harms matter. Whatever
they are, or whatever causes them, harms matter. It matters that someone loses their job,
suffers mentally, experiences a heart attack, has a long illness, suicides or dies of cancer.
Imagine the improbable: that suicide is just a consequence of a random act of willfulness.
It matters nonetheless. The suicide—a death, any death—matters none the less because no
life—any life—matters none the more. All life is equally valuable.
1 I will not distinguish below between Federal and State levels. Though each functions differently, via the
taxation system, both are complicit (see e.g. Doughney 2002, Chapter 1; 2006)
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Yet, I would argue, not all harms are the same. An accidental death is not the same as a
murder, and nor is a death from natural causes. The loss is the same, but a murder adds the
harm of willful injustice to the random injustice of natural caprice and to the physical/
psychological harm of mere death. ‘Mere death’ is also an odd phrase, but I think we all
know intuitively what it means in this context. We grieve equally the loss of a natural death,
the accidental death and the murder. Yet we despair at the random injustice of accidental
death, and we rage at the terrible injustice of a murder.
Although I have made similar remarks before (Doughney 2002), citing the views of
philosophers such as Simone Weil and Raymond Gaita, I was reminded of their force by an
opinion article by Nicholas Kristof reprinted by the Melbourne Age (Kristof 2006) from the
New York Times. The piece was an appeal for action by the international community to stop
the genocide in Darfur. The author’s contention was that the deaths in Darfur commanded
special moral attention because, even though more human beings in total may die in wars or
from epidemics, there was something especially horrific about genocide. These deaths were
the intentional work of a government, acting itself and through agents, to wreak a terrible
vengeance on a people.
We mark the distinction between causes of death not because there is a quantitative
difference in death per se. Death is equally tragic, ceteris paribus,2 because life is equally
valuable. The difference is in the cause. Some causes are more or less inevitable, and some
are more or less avoidable. We might guard against the risk of accidents, but a murder is
entirely dependent on volition and therefore is entirely avoidable. Something about the fact
that someone inflicts avoidable harm willfully makes that harm (and not its consequences)
more egregious and more unjust.
I have used the examples of death and murder for two reasons. First, examples at the
limit—extreme examples—help to highlight ethical-moral dilemmas. Secondly, the examples
of death and murder actually relate directly and unequivocally to the similarities and dif-
ferences between EGM and tobacco industry products. Both industries/products cause harm.
Both cause avoidable harm. Both cause death, which is to say that the ultimate physical
consequence of harm results from their use. Moreover no industry must produce cigarettes
or EGMs. It is a question of volition or choice. Producers produce these products for a
reason. They choose to do so, and governments provide the legal framework in which indi-
viduals, both humans and corporate, can make that choice. Governments therefore choose,
too. The least they do in both the EGM and tobacco cases is to license dangerous products that
cause death. They do so knowingly.
Of course, governments also create the legal framework for other products that can cause
grave harms: motor vehicles, or kitchen knives, or power tools, or petrochemicals and so
on.3 What is the difference? I think there are two important differences. The first concerns
the manufacturer/supplier’s intentions. Manufacturers and suppliers of the above products
intend their products to have safe uses (driving to work, slicing bread, drilling holes and
manufacturing plastics etc.). They issue product safety guidelines that suggest safe ways to
use the product and to minimize the risk of accident. In the case of cars, for example,
governments impose additional rules (speed limits, seatbelts, airbags etc.) to restrict the
scope for accident or harms caused by accidents. Manufacturers of cutlery do not intend
2 Other things remaining the same. A peaceful death in old age after a well-lived, fulfilling life is different
from the painful death of a child from cancer.
3 Obviously we may consider alcohol and illicit drugs as well. However, to do so would extend the scope of
this paper unreasonably. Hence I will resist the temptation.
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that carving knives be used to kill. Carmakers do not intend that their products veer into
oncoming traffic.
Nonetheless governments regulate the use of the motor vehicles rigorously. The most
obvious restriction is that adults must be licensed to use the product. The license holds our
addresses and can be cross-referenced to our vehicles by their registration plates. We readily
assent to such restrictions because we know that cars, used wrongly, can cause awful harms
and death. Yet governments have failed to regulate the EGMs as rigorously. As outspoken
industry critic Sue Pinkerton is fond of reminding us, Ford and GM-Holden would be
pilloried if 15% of their vehicles went to road with known harm-causing design faults. Such
harm-causing features we call ‘faults’ in vehicles, but in EGMs they are just design
features. Language is important in policy discourse, as are efforts to decode it and express it
in common terms.
In contrast to motor-vehicle industry regulation EGM regulation has both created the
industry and given it the space in which its control-impairing and harm-causing features
(faults by any other name) can flourish. The same is evidently true for tobacco. Whatever
dents regulation and other forms for government intervention (warnings, regional caps, etc.)
have caused, they manifestly have not changed the EGM and tobacco delivery regimes
qualitatively.
My reason for considering other potentially dangerous products has been to demonstrate
why both the EGM and tobacco products are different from them and should be treated
differently. The difference is simply this: unlike the other industries mentioned, the EGM
and tobacco industries intend users to consume their products in precisely the ways that
directly, and without further mediation, initiate the casual chain that results in known
harms. Smokers must light the cigarette and breathe in the smoke. Rothmans do not intend
that a packet of Winfield be lit in a bucket and observed for its smoke patterns at a distance
of five meters. Similarly the EGM industry intends that users sit at the machines, play, and
lose. They do not intend that users set a loss limit of $2 and then get up off their seats and
walk away. Likewise the tobacco industry does not intend that smokers merely smoke one
cigarette per week. Both industries supply control-impairing products that, used as intended,
will inevitably cause some users to suffer profoundly. They will suffer because the products,
used as intended, will cause them to use the product in harmful quantities. Almost all smokers
will smoke potentially lethal amounts. The EGM product,4 used precisely as intended, will
cause users to lose control of time and money in sufficient numbers for the industry to
flourish.
Understanding the distinctions just described helps us to understand some of the ethical
dimensions of the EGM policy debate. However, we can understand better the ethical
problems specific to EGMs if we now explore some of the distinctions between the EGM
and tobacco industries. I have already mentioned the first one, but I will mention five other
differences:
1. Government created the EGM industry for neo-liberal budgetary reasons
2. Government is a partner in the EGM industry
3. Increased tobacco taxes reduce smoking, partly because use is more evenly distributed
across smokers than it is across users of the EGM product
4. Increasing the consumer cost (‘taxes’) of the product is unlikely to reduce use and losses
because of the problem of ‘user concentration’
4 We must take the word ‘product’ to mean all of the product’s various aspects, namely its manufacture,
technology, distribution, means of provision, industry structure, licences and modes of consumption.
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5. It is easier to identify those whom EGMs will harm than to identify which smokers will
contract potentially lethal illnesses
It is essential to understand the fourth difference above, a particular feature of the EGM
industry: ‘user concentration.’ Losses concentrate among a relatively small proportion of
users (though the absolute number can be as high in Victoria as one-quarter of a million
people). It is misleading therefore to rely on average data. For example, a witness statement
given to the Productivity Commission in 1998 by Tabcorp senior executive Tricia Wunsch
said that 80% of total losses (i.e. Tabcorp’s total revenues) came from 20% of users. This is
what she said:
One thing that I will say, just in terms of where the revenue comes from, is there’s a
general 80:20 rule, the idea that 80 percent of your revenue comes from 20 percent of
your customers, and that’s certainly true in our business as well. Obviously some-
where in that 20 percent would fall anyone that might have problems with gambling
but I couldn’t say how much. (Wunsch 1998)
Equally significant are statements in a leaked report concerning a card-based loyalty
membership scheme tested by EGM operator Tattersall’s across 13 venues in 2002. The
authors regarded members of the trial scheme as a reasonable approximation of poker-
machine users in general (Tattersall’s 2002, p. 42). The key data derived from the member-
ship program were that 15% of users contribute 57% of losses and 34% of users contribute
82% of losses. The 15% were regulars. They spent an average of 2 h and 33 min at the
machines and lost more than $100 each visit (Tattersall’s CRP 2002, p. 42). Using data for
‘participation rates’ or ‘prevalence rates’—i.e. the percentage of adults who use EGMs in a
given year—we can calculate the average losses per year for the heavy users (i.e. the 15%
above). The formula is:
Lh ¼ 60=15ð Þ 
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P
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That is, average losses per heavy user (Lh) are equal to four times (which, of course, is
also equal to 80/20) the ratio of total user losses (ΣL) to the number of the adult population
who use EGMs (i.e. total adult population (ΣP) times (u) the participation rate). Table 1
gives the data for participation rate 33.33%, which corresponds to the most recently estimated
rate of 33.5%.
Table 1 EGM Losses Revenues for Heavy Users Victoria and Melbourne Dollars and Percent ‘Equivalised’
Household Disposable Income
Total Net Losses Per
Adult (18+) 2004–2005
(2005 Population
Projection)
Total Net Losses Per
Heavy User 2004–2005
(with 33.3% Rate)
Total Net Losses Per
Heavy User 2004–2005
(with 33.3% Rate) as
Percent of Approx.
Equivalised HDI (%)
Metropolitan total 664.77 $8,141 28.4
Victorian total 618.27 $7,419 25.9
Sources: VCGR (2005a, b), ABS (2005)
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Table 1 also gives figures for the share of household disposable income (HDI) constituted
by heavy losses. The term ‘equivalised’ HDI means the following:
...average (mean) equivalised disposable household income... (i.e., the income that a
single person household would require to maintain the same standard of living as the
average person living in all private dwellings in Australia) was $549 per week (ABS
2005).
The weekly amount of $549 translates to almost $29,000 per year. Heavy users with
average disposable incomes therefore lose an average of one-quarter or more of their dis-
posable income to EGMs (i.e. to the industry). Even if we assume that heavy users of
EGMs have the same income distribution among them as do Victorians as a whole, this
means that a substantial majority of the population of EGM users will have lower incomes.
The reason is simple: more Victorians have lower incomes than have higher incomes. What
happens is that the higher incomes, not the numbers of people who have them, pull up the
averages. Hence the majority of Victorians, and the majority of EGM users, will have
‘equivalised HDIs’ that are less than $29,000 per year. Hence the actual percentage of the
disposable income of heavy users taken by the industry as revenue will be significantly
greater than the 26–28% figure shown in Table 1.
The EGM industry unambiguously depends on losses of this magnitude. Without them
revenues would be more than halved. Yet losses of this magnitude inevitably cause harm. If
loss of control were merely a matter of people spending excessive time in front of a computer
screen, then we might fear for their sociability. However, when that loss of control combines
with the ferocious revenue-generating, loss-causing algorithms of the EGM, the financial
consequences set in motion the complex causal chain of events and decisions that devastate
lives. In this sense the physical/psychological harms, while not strictly a direct or first-order
means to achieve the EGM industry’s ends, are a means nonetheless. The reason is that large
concentrated losses are the main means to the industry’s end, and all other harms stem directly
from them.
Unlike the tobacco industry, the EGM industry can readily identify (electronically by
mandatory user-card systems and ordinary observation) those who lose too much time and,
therefore, too much money. The signs by their nature are not hidden. However, given the
distribution of cigarette smokers it is harder to know which individuals will succumb to lung
cancer, for example. The cellular signs of the disease-in-itself are by their nature hidden.
Certainly predictors such as heavy smoking, family history and other co-morbidities are
apparent, but exactly who will contract the disease is opaque until he or she does. EGM harm
by comparison is easier to detect and to prevent by intervention. That the industry does not
genuinely act to avoid avoidable harm to identifiable individuals makes that harm intrin-
sically worse. We also know that co-morbidities between alcohol, smoking and gambling
necessarily increase the risk of harm. Yet the mode of delivery of EGMs in hotels and clubs,
‘smoking rooms’ notwithstanding, actually facilitates continuous use, loss of control and
harm.
The fact that concentrated losses of the above magnitude are necessary for the industry
to function as it does is more than sufficient reason for action. Nevertheless, when we couple
the physical and psychological harms with the injustice of it all, then the case for action
becomes compelling. What is the injustice, again? The injustice stems from the fact that the
EGM industry knows that such harms will occur necessarily. The industry knows the real
price that many will pay for using its product precisely in the manner intended. Yet the
industry makes the choice to market the product nonetheless (as does the tobacco industry
with its). In making that choice—a free, unforced choice made in the interests of profit—the
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industry acts causally. By its own volition it becomes the cause of others’ suffering, regardless
of whether or not it acts within the legal parameters set by the government of the day. It
becomes an unethical agent. The industry therefore is morally culpable in that, knowing the
harms, it chooses to accept them as part of the complex intentions it acts upon in marketing its
product (its ends). The tobacco industry does this equally, though the EGM industry
additionally fails to intervene when it can readily identify the signs of harm to individuals and
thereby act to prevent them.
More serious injustice occurs in the case of EGMs, however, because our governments
are partners in causing the harm. In breach of their duty to protect, they created the EGM
industry and maintain it still. Why? The answer, too, lies in a venal arithmetic: accumulated
revenue. The term ‘industry’ is, of course, just a placeholder for the proper names of
shareholders in total EGM revenue. Government is the major (institutional) shareholder. It
has vested its managerial control in executive (operator) shareholders: Tattersall’s and
Tabcorp. They in turn franchise to the locals: the pubs and clubs.
What then should we do? What should researchers advocate? What should social
activists call for? I must confess that, the longer I research this subject, the simpler my
answers become. Right now I think that the best response is this: market a product made
qualitatively safer or none at all. This is the precautionary principle, which should have
prevailed from the outset. The lesser evil between none at all and the present product
regime is none at all. Perhaps that will help to put product-safety measures such as user-
card technologies and serious reductions in machine numbers on the policy agenda.
Wither research? Research continues to be important, of course, but for shaping an
ethical public policy we already know quite enough about the EGM industry.
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